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STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
The pertinent facts in this case were fully detailed in Appellant's opening brief. While
the facts will not be fully reiterated so as to avoid unnecessary repetition, they are summarized
herein for the Court's convenience.
On September 13, 2005, Appellant was residing and working in New Mexico and
telephonically contacted Joy Jelte (hereinafter Jelte), his divorce attorney, who was at her office
in Salt Lake County. This conversation was not recorded. On September 16, 2005, Jelte called
Appellant and recorded the ensuing conversation. Again, Jelte was located in Salt Lake County
and Appellant was located in New Mexico. There is no evidence indicating that Appellant
expected or intended the substance of either call to be communicated to anyone other than his
former counsel with whom he was speaking. Appellant, therefore, reasonably believed that any

statements he made to his attorney would remain confidential. Although he did not waive this
confidentiality, the conversation was recorded and disclosed to the State without his knowledge
or consent.
The context in which the allegedly incriminating statements were made was detailed in
Appellant's opening brief. The following specific interactions are heard on the recording and
pertain most directly to the issue at bar:
FEMALE:

DEFT:
FEMALE:
DEFT:
FEMALE:

DEFT:

DEFT:
FEMALE:
DEFT:

DEFT:

Oh, okay, and I apologize. I haven't looked at your file, and so I'm
not real up to speed on what the issues are. I plan on doing that
over the weekend, starting with first looking at the transcript, the
objection, and then looking back at the other notes, and so on, so
I'm going to have to get up to speed on it before I do anything else,
and are you going to be going to Richfield?
(Inaudible) court date?
Uh huh.
Yeah.
Okay, cuz between now and then, weTl probably need to talk once
more about what the issues are and what position you want to take
and so on, so, but I probably won't give you a call back til Sunday
when I get into it a little bit more. I'm not going to spend that
much time with it tonight, other than to maybe glance through the
transcript.
Okay.

Yeah. He's a hypocrite. He doesn't follow the law. He's a judge.
He doesn't follow the law.
I think you need to reserve judgment til we get through this next
hearing.
Well, we'll see, but it's not going to change. I think Lyman's a
piece of shit.

There's no need to worry, Joy, my mind's made up. I'm not
suicidal. I'm not. I have a really good life down here. I have fun
all the time, you know. It's just, there'll be justice.
-2-

FEMALE:

Yeah, there'll be justice. You'll get caught.

DEFT:

I'm not depressed, Joy. I mean, after I get off the phone with you,
it's Friday night. I'll go out and have fun. I've got things set up
for tonight. I mean, I have a good life.
Well, then don't blow it.

FEMALE:

FEMALE:
DEFT:

I think you'll feel better after this hearing.
You know what? I doubt it. And I'm not getting dressed up for
this hearing, either. I'm coming in a t-shirt and Levis.

DEFT:

But all that said, you know what? If I leave it alone, things are just
gonna go on as usual, and it's just gonna keep happening to
somebody else. The judge refuses to follow the law and attorneys,
yep, you know what? It's gotta end sometime.
Look, I'm not gonna get in an argument with you about this. I just
think that you're just not thinking clearly, and I think you'll feel
better after the next hearing, and I want you to snap out of it. I'm
sincere. As your friend, as your lawyer, as a friend to your parents.
As a friend, even to your kids. I really want you to snap out of it,
Jeff. You know better.
Well, I don't have anything planned in the near future.

FEMALE:

DEFT:

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMNT
In reference to Appellants motion to quash, the State argues that, contrary to Fixel,
the crime of retaliation against a judge merely requires the State to establish that a threat
to retaliate was made with general intent. The State asks this Court to adopt what it refers
to as a "general intent/motivation" approach to retaliation cases. However, this Court has
previously held that retaliation cases, such as both Fixel and the case at bar, require the
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State to establish that a threat was made and that it was made with the specific intent to
retaliate against the judge. A such, where this Court has previously ruled on this issue,
the State's argument should be rejected accordingly.
In relation to the issue concerning the application of the attorney-client privilege,
the State argues that Appellant made a disclosure, and therefore waived privilege, when
he stipulated to the entry of the recording into evidence solely for purposes of the
preliminary hearing. However, this argument fails where Appellant made no disclosure
of the contents of the recorded conversation. That disclosure was made by his former
Attorney, Jelte. Defendant did not waive privilege by mounting a defense to charges
resulting from the disclosure made by former counsel.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE SPECIFIC INTENT ELEMENT ENUMERATED IN §76-8316 REQUIRES PROOF THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD A
REASONABLE BELIEF THAT THE JUDGE WOULD LEARN
THAT THE THREAT WAS MADE.

Appellant, while not conceding that the State established probable cause as to the
first two elements of retaliation against a judge, recognizes that the primary issue at this
juncture centers on the third element: that of the specific intent to retaliate against a
judge. The State proposes two alternative readings of the statute at issue. The State asks
this Court to adopt a reading of the statute whereby the specific intent language modifies
the threatened action and not the threat itself. (Aplee Br. at 20). Under this approach, if a
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defendant threatened to assault a judge, and the assault was to be retaliatory, it would not
matter with what specific intent the threat itself was made. The State would only need to
establish general intent.
Stated otherwise, the statute criminalizes the act of making threats. In Fixel, this
Court held that, in retaliation cases, the act of making the threat to assault etc. must be
accompanied by the specific intent to retaliate against the judge. Notwithstanding this
holding, the State argues that the crime is committed where a threat is made with a
general intent as long as the threatened action would have been in retaliation for some
official action.
However, the State recognizes that other courts view the term "with intent to
retaliate" as affecting the threat itself. These courts, including this Court, hold that the
threat itself must be made with the specific intent to retaliate against the judge. The State
further recognizes that this Court has previously stated, "it is not enough that a threat is
uttered. It has to be uttered with a specific intent." (Aplee Br. at 22 quoting Fixel, 945
P.2d at 151). This reading, requiring the threat to be issued with the specific intent to
retaliate comports with the plain reading of the statute as well as this Court's previous
interpretation thereof.
The applicable statute, Utah Code Ann. §76-8-316(1) reads in pertinent part as
follows:
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(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if the person threatens to assault,
kidnap, or murder a judge or a member of the Board of Pardons and Parole with
the intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with the judge or member of the
board while engaged in the performance of the judge's or member's official duties
or with the intent to retaliate against the judge or member on account of the
performance of those official duties.
See State v. FixeU 945 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah App. 1997) (emphasis in original).
This Court further reasoned, in interpreting the statute, as follows:
To be guilty of the offense, a person must "threaten[ ] to assault, kidnap, or
murder a judge." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-316(1) (Supp.1996). The person
must make his threat either "with the intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere"
with the judge's performance of official duties "or with the intent to retaliate
against the judge . . . on account of the performance of those official duties." Id.
... Thus, the court's instruction to the jury is beyond reproach . . . .
Id. at 151-52. It should be noted that the elements instruction referred described by this
Court as being "beyond reproach" read as follows:
In order for you [to] find the defendant guilty of the offense of THREATENING
A JUDGE, a Third Degree Felony, you must find that each of the following
essential elements of the crime charged in the Information have been established
beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. That the defendant, Dennis W. Fixel,
2. On or about October 2, 1995,
3. In Utah County, Utah,
4. Did threaten to assault, kidnap, or murder a judge
5. a. With the intent to impede, intimidate, or interfere with the judge while
engaged in the performance of the judge's official duties, or
b. With the intent to retaliate against the judge on account of the performance of
those official duties.
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Therefore, as this Court held in Pixel, the threat itself must be made with the
specific intent to retaliate against the judge. It should be noted that Fixel involved a
retaliatory threat as is alleged in the instant case. In Fixel, the defendant was
"[apparently upset about the bail determination" Id. at 150. The prosecution made it
clear that the case involved retaliation when it argued in closing as follows: "Did the
defendant make a threat, and was that threat made in retaliation to something the judge
had done? That's the question you have to answer. I don't have to prove to you he
intended to kill the judge. Did he make a threat to murder a judge and was that done in
retaliation for what had happened in court?" Id.
Therefore, as the State itself made clear in its closing in the Fixel trial, both Fixel
and the case at bar involved allegations of retaliatory statements. In Fixel, this Court
made it clear that, in such cases, "[t]he person must make his threat. . . 'with the intent to
retaliate against the judge . . . on account of the performance of those official duties.'" Id.
at 151-52. Consequently, the State's argument that it is only the threatened action and not
the threat itself that must be modified by the specific intent to retaliate contradicts the
prior ruling of his Court in Fixel and should be rejected accordingly.
In the alternative, should this Court overrule its holding in Fixel, that in retaliation
cases a threat must be made with the specific intent to retaliate against a judge, the State's
position fails where it cannot establish that a true threat was uttered in this case. The
State refers to the same cases to support its position that, contrary to Fixel, this Court
-7-

should utilize a "general intent/motivation approach" as it does to support its position that
a true threat was made in the instant case. Where the State apparently draws a nexus
between the two issues, even if this Court adopts the "general intent/motivation
approach" proposed by the State, its position fails where no true threat was uttered in this
case.
Appellant repeatedly indicated that he did not plan to act, imminently or otherwise,
on any of his statements. When his attorney raised the issue of bringing guns to Utah
when he appeared at the hearing, Appellant replied that he would leave his guns at home.
®. at 254, p. 23). He stated that nothing would happen imminently. (Id. at 24). He
further referred to the high quality of life he enjoyed, which contradicted any intent to
commit a crime that would cause him to compromise it. (Id. at 20). The foregoing
examples, coupled with the fact that Appellant resided in another state, demonstrate that,
even under the definition proffered by the State, no true threat was made in this case.

H.

ANY STATEMENTS DEFENDANT MADE TO HIS ATTORNEY ARE
PRIVILEGED AND SO MAY NOT BE ENTERED INTO EVIDENCE
AGAINST HIM AT TRIAL.

The attorney-client privilege "is intended to encourage candor between attorney and client
and promote the best possible representation of the client." Gold Standard, Inc. v. American
Barrick Resources (USA), Inc., 801 P.2d 909, 911 (Utah 1990). "It is the oldest of the common
law privileges protecting confidential communications." Doe v. Maret, 984 P.2d 980 (Utah
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1999); citing Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 101 S.Ct. 677, 66 L.Ed.2d 584
(1981) (citing Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2290, Utah Code Ann. at 542
(McNaughten 1961)). The privilege is recognized and described in Rule 504 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence as well as by statute at 78-24-8(2) (1996).
Rule 504, relating to the admission of privileged information, reads in pertinent part as
follows:
(b) General Rule of Privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communications made for
the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal services to the client
between the client and the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's
representatives, and lawyers representing others in matters of common interest,
and among the client's representatives, lawyers, lawyer's representatives, and
lawyers representing others in matters of common interest, in any combination.
©) Who May Claim the Privilege. The privilege may be claimed by the client..

(d) Exceptions. No privilege exists under this rule:
(1) Furtherance of Crime or Fraud. If the services of the lawyer were sought or
obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client
knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud; or . ..
(3) Breach of Duty by Lawyer or Client. As to a communication relevant to
an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to the client or by the client to the
lawyer; o r . . . .

In giving guidance as to how this section should be applied, the Advisory
Committee Notes following Rule 504 state, "The client is entitled not only to refuse to
disclose the confidential communication, but also to prevent disclosure by the lawyer or
others who were involved in the conference or learned, without the knowledge of the
-9-

client, the content of the confidential communication." In this case, the State "learned,
without the knowledge of the client, the content of the confidential communication."
As fully detailed in his opening brief, Appellant is, therefore, entitled to prevent
the State from disclosing that evidence to the jury in the form of evidence pursuant to
Rule 504 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.1 Nonetheless, the State argues that Appellant
waived this issue when he stipulated to the entry of the recording at issue into evidence.
The State argues that Appellant waived privilege by disclosing the contents of the
conversation to a third party when he stipulated to its use at the preliminary hearing.
However, the State's argument fails because Appellant did not disclose the contents of
the conversation, his former counsel, Jelte, did so. As stated in Rule 504, only th client
may waive th privilege. Appellant did not disclose the contents of the conversation by
stipulation or otherwise. His prior attorney disclosed the contents f the conversation.
Appellant waived no privilege by mere defending against th charges brought as a result.

!

Utah Code Ann. §78-24-8 also relates to the assertion of the attorney-client privilege
and states that "[a]n attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to
any communication made . . . in the course of his professional employment." Under this
section, Jelte could not be examined regarding the substance of her conversations with
Defendant. Therefore, the State will be unable to establish foundation for the recording
and it will be inadmissible for this reason independent of the mandates of Rule 504.
However, it must be noted that this section was superceded by the adoption of Rule 504
of the Utah Rules of Evidence. Spratley v. State Farm, 78 P.3d 603 (Utah 2003).
Nonetheless, the section constitutes persuasive authority consistent with Defendant's
position in this regard.
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The Advisory committee Note to Rule 507 o the Utah Rules of Evidence explains
that an evidentiary privilege is wived only where the holder, in this case Appellant,
"voluntarily discloses or consents to the disclosure of any significant part of he matter of
communication." In this case, Appellant made no such disclosure, the disclosure was
made by Jelte. Furthermore, the only disclosure of which the State speaks was not made
voluntarily where Appellant was merely mounting a defense against charges brought as a
result of Jelte's actions.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Based upon the foregoing, Appellant respectfully requests this Court to reverse the
rulings o the trial court in respect to his Motion to Quash and Motion in Limine.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 23rd day of April, 2006.

YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

EARL XAIZ
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby declare that I mailed/delivered two true and correct copies of the
foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief, postage prepaid, this 23rd day of April, 2006, to:
J. FREDERICK VOROS, JR.
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Appeals Division
160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
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